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THE RIO REVISION OF THE WARSAW
CONVENTION - PART II
By GEORGE W. ORR
Director of Claims, United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc.
The Legitimate Economic Issues Involved
May I give my conception of the real economic issues involved?
Working constantly with members of the legal profession as chairman
of Aeronautical Law Committees in both the American Bar and New
York State Bar Associations, I am conscious of the pressure for an in-
creased limit. I recognize the various motives - social, selfish, and the
prevailing inadequate understanding of the international considera-
tions involved. I can appreciate the influence of the U. S. delegation
which frankly states that the only objective it believes to be of impor-
tance is getting more money for the claimant. I am forced to agree
that an increase is necessary, even though not wanted by a majority of
the nations and not economically justified for an international con-
vention. I therefore agree with the action of the majority of the Legal
Committee in increasing the limit 50% or even the 60% finally agreed
upon. I believe that such a sum can be justified but I do not believe
that a greater increase should be accepted, regardless of the tactics of
the delegates demanding more. To arbitrarily insist that all nations
accept a standard simply because a small group of nations consider the
limitation too low by their own standards, or that for social reasons
there should be a greater sharing of the wealth by a supposedly more
prosperous aviation industry, would be about the quickest way to
destroy a useful and needed instrument.
The imposition of liability - absolute or presumed - upon the
carrier for passenger injury is repugnant to the established law in the
United States and reactionary in the extreme. The Warsaw Conven-
tion - in direct conflict with this established law - arbitrarily imposes
liability upon the carrier. Article 17 says: "The carrier shall be
liable...." It is presumptive rather than absolute solely because of
the difficult option of affirmative defense permitted in Article 20 pre-
viously discussed. Since it does impose liability, this departure from
established law would appear to reasonably justify a conservative limi-
tation in consideration of the added burden upon the party accused
of wrong. Let us not lose sight of the fact that the United States is a
party to such an agreement, not because it believes in forsaking its
established principles of liability with respect to aviation, but because
it was necessary to compromise with the less progressive laws of other
lands in which the cancer of radical socialism has consistently en-
croached upon the social gains of personal liberty and initiative and to
equal justice to all. The acceptance by the U. S. A. of this imposed
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liability is a major consideration for continuing the limit at a reason-
able international average.
The very real sacrifice of the U. S. compromise in permitting pre-
sumed liability to supplant our regular rule of liability is depreciated
by those who incorrectly insist that to all practical effect, the rule of
presumed liability exists today in the U. S. because of the fairly general
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. This is simply not
true with respect to aviation.
12
Present Warsaw Limit Accepted by Many Nations Domestically
When given informed thought, there are many indications that the
$8,300 limitation in the existing treaty is in fact not "too low" for an
international treaty, and the proposed $13,267 compares most favor-
ably with U. S. standards. This is an international agreement depend-
ing for its value upon general adherence by many nations. Even though
$8,300 may seem low by U. S. standards, it is not low by the standards
of most nations - certainly those which have indicated an amount by
statutory limitation. For instance, while Brazil is an adherent to the
Warsaw Convention, it places a lower limit on domestic and non-
Warsaw liability. The important nations previously mentioned, and
other nations in Europe and Latin America, limit domestic liability at
the Warsaw limit or less. I have handled hundreds of death and injury
claims in foreign nations, many of which have no limit whatever on
liability. These actual settlements in other nations than the U, S.
average well within the present limits provided by the Warsaw Con-
vention. The limitation must be kept low enough, not simply to
satisfy our U. S. ideas of a reasonable amount, but to have the limita-
tion acceptable to the great majority of nations.
The argument is rather uncontradictable that in more than twenty
years many nations of the world have not adhered to the Warsaw Con-
vention - and those who handle claims internationally sincerely be-
lieve that it is because the present limitation is too high. For exam-
ple, only two nations - Brazil and Argentina (excepting European
dependents) of all the American nations south of Mexico - are ad-
herents to the Warsaw Convention and Argentina did not adhere until
1952. This means that nearly twenty nations with which the U. S.
has constant air commerce have not extended to their citizens or to
our citizens the protection afforded by the Warsaw Convention. While
most important European nations are adherents, there are some ten
or twelve European jurisdictions still not adhering and there are few
Near Eastern, Asiatic or African adherents. Although accepted by
most of the important nations of the world, the Warsaw Convention
still has far from world-wide acceptance. It is considered by many that
we will run a grave danger of further discouraging a wider acceptance
of the Convention by raising the limit and even that there is a definite
risk of losing some of the present adherents.
12 McLarty, January 1951 Virginia Law Review, p. 55.
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Limit Has Been Increased by Currency Devaluation
In suggesting that the Warsaw limit should be increased, most
people believe that there has been no increase since the Convention
was signed in 1929. This is definitely untrue. The limitation has
actually been materially increased. This is because the limit on dam-
ages is based on the gold standard and all nations, including the United
States, have devalued their currency with respect to gold. For instance,
the value of gold has gone up more in the United States than the cost
of living, according to the U. S. Air Coordinating Committee's own
Economic Division. Generally speaking, the local equivalent in cur-
rency of the limit provided by the Warsaw Convention will buy more
in the U. S. A. and most other nations, according to information filed
with the U. S. Air Coordinating Committee in 195313 than when the
limit was originally fixed in Warsaw in 1929.
As a matter of fact, an analysis of statutory limitation and settle-
ments of American airline death claims supports the theory that
$8,300 is not so far out of line even with U. S. standards and the pro-
posed $13,267 is above them, if the imposition of presumptive liability
is considered. The effort should be to arrive at a reasonable average
limit. In arriving at such a figure with respect to fatal injury, the fact
that about one-third of U. S. jurisdictions - some seventeen or eigh-
teen14 - have declared themselves is certainly relevant. When a limit
is imposed, it certainly cannot take into consideration the extreme
cases since anyone experienced in handling claims knows that the
limit sets a sort of standard and that demands are usually made on the
basis of the limit, regardless of merit. The average limitation on dam-
ages of these states which have declared themselves is under $15,000.
Men handling a large part of the airline claims throughout the United
States (including my own experience) considering both the limited
and unlimited states, confirm that average death settlements are about
the same - around $15,000. The states which have not fixed a limit
also do not presume liability and therefore are not comparable. When
it is considered that liability is not presumed in a single instance in
which liability for wrongful death is limited by U. S. states, the reduc-
tion of the U. S. average by less than half by the present Warsaw limi-
tation does not seem "so low." The proposed $13,267 would appear
to be very nearly in line with U. S. standards, even disregarding the
imposition of liability.
A majority of the states in the Union limit recovery in case of both
fatal and non-fatal injury where the employer-employee relationship
exists; limiting recovery to an amount quite comparable with the
Warsaw Convention limit - $9,517.09 for fatal injury and $11,968.28
13 Chart of John E. J. Clare.
14 Alaska, $15,000; Colorado, $10,000; Illinois, $20,000; Indiana, $15,000;
Kansas, $15,000; Maine, $10,000; Massachusetts, $15,000; Minnesota, $17,500;
Missouri, $15,000; New Hampshire, $15,000; Oregon, $15,000; South Dakota,
$10,000; Virginia, $25.000; West Virgina, $10,000; Wisconsin, $15,000; and
Common carrier only, New Mexico, $10,000.
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for non-fatal.' 5 Like the Warsaw Convention, liability is imposed in
such statutes. This indicates that the proposed 60% increase of the
Warsaw Convention limit is above U. S. precedent, even in the case
of non-fatal injury. And these are 1952 figures, reflecting the changes
in the past 20 years.
The conclusion seems clear that the present limit of 125,000 francs,
or certainly nothing above the proposed 60% increase should be pro-
vided in such an international treaty.
An Ambiguous Baggage Provision
Article 22, Paragraph 2, adds the following provision:
"In the case of loss, damage or delay of part of registered baggage
or cargo, or of any article contained therein, the weight to be taken
into consideration in determining the amount to which the carrier's
liability is limited shall be only the total weight of the package or
packages concerned. Nevertheless, when the loss, damage or delay
of a part of the registered baggage or cargo, or of an article con-
tained therein, affects the value of other packages covered by the
same baggage check or the same air waybill (consignment note),
the total weight of such package or packages shall also be taken into
consideration in determining the limit of liability."
This is utterly confusing to me. It first says that in case of loss,
etc., of part of registered baggage or cargo, or any article contained
therein, the weight to be taken into consideration shall be only the
total weight of the package concerned. Then it goes on to say that,
when the loss, etc. affects the value of other packages covered by the
same baggage check or air waybill, the total weight of such package
shall also be taken into consideration. Perhaps it means that if the
bag containing the coat to a suit is lost and the bag containing
the trousers is delivered, the breaking of the ensemble would affect the
value of the loss. But, I am afraid that provision will cause confusion,
and therefore suggest that the last sentence be omitted.
15 Analysis U.S. Workmen's Compensation Laws, U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
January, 1952.
Fatal: Alabama, $6,900; Arkansas, $8,000; California $8 750; Colorado,$8,764; Georgia, $6,120; Florida, $12,250; Illinois, $9,600; Indiana, $13,500; Ken-
tucky, $8,500; Maine, $6,000; Louisiana, $9,000; Maryland, $10,000; Massachu-
setts, $10,000; Idaho, $10,000; Iowa, $8,400; Kansas, $6,000; Michigan, $12,800;
Minnesota, $10,000; Mississippi, $8,600; Missouri, $12,000; Montana, $13,750;
Nebraska, $8,450; New Hampshire, $9,000; New Mexico, $16,500; North Carolina,$8,000; Ohio, $9,000; Oklahoma, $13,500; Rhode Island, $9,600; South Carolina,$8,000; South Dakota, $7,500; Tennessee, $7,500; Texas, $9,000; Texas, $9,000;
Utah, $9,781.25; Vermont, $6,500; Virginia, $6,600; Wyoming, $12,350; Average
for 36 states: $9,517.09.
Non-Fatal: Alabama, $9,200; Arkansas, $8,000; Connecticut, $28,080; Geor-
gia, $8,400; Indiana, $10,000; Iowa, $14,000; Kansas, $10,375; Kentucky, $10,000;
Louisian, $12,000; Maine, $9,000; Maryland, $10,000; Michigan, $25,500; Minne-
sota, $18,000; Mississippi, $8,600; Montana, $13,750; New Hampshire, $9,000;
New Mexico, $16,500; North Carolina, $8,000; Oklahoma, $8,500; Pennsylvania,
$20,000; Rhode Island, $14,000; South Carolina, $8,000; South Dakota, $7,500;
Tennessee, $7,500; Texas, $10,025; Utah, $11,000; Vermont, $6,500; Virginia,
$7,800; Wyoming, $13,850. Average for 29 states: $11,968.28.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
Escape Clause Much Improved
In Article 25, Paragraphs 1 and 2, which provided that the dam-
ages would not be limited if caused by willful misconduct ("dol"), or
such default as is considered to be equivalent to willful misconduct,
are deleted and replaced by:
"The limits of liability specified in Article 22 of the Convention
shall not apply if it is proved that the damage resulted from a
deliberate act or omission of the carrier, his servants or agents,
done with intent to cause damage; provided that, in the case of a
deliberate act or omission of a servant or agent, it is also proved
that he was acting in the course of his employment."
In my opinion, this is by far the most valuable change recom-
mended and should be retained, despite the efforts of those opposing
the same, either as a lever to get more damages or to produce more
attorneys' fees from litigation.
The present provision has cost the airlines and the plaintiffs hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars since the attempt to void the limitation
has been responsible for most of the costly litigation under the War-
saw Convention.
I have strongly advocated the omission of any Escape Clause. So
long as escape from liability is a possibility, and certainly so long as
escape is dependent upon a factual situation, such a provision is a
definite encouragement to litigation. Every person who is dissatisfied
with the limitation is invited to try his luck. The airline, although
technically not bearing the burden of proof, is put to great expense in
preparing the case, legal and witness fees, and disruption of its business
by the absence of important employees who are necessary witnesses.
The plaintiff is put to similar costs and delay in receiving legitimate
damages. A factual situation is presented. What constitutes a delib-
erate act or omission? As long as there is any chance of escaping the
limit of liability, the limit is simply not a limit, as no lawyer can foretell
the action of a court or jury. A limit is valuable if retained at a rea-
sonable amount, but any chance of escape seriously impairs its value.
And why are the members of the ICAO Legal Committee so insist-
ent upon an escape? In all my years of handling the thousands of
claims arising from airline wrecks in this country and some thirty other
jurisdictions, I have never seen anything that even legitimately sug-
gested deliberate intention to cause injury. To me, insistence that
such a situation is so likely that costly provision for it is indispensable -
and it has and will cost carriers and passengers the equivalent of hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars - is no less than fantastic! No one wants
to reward intentional harm with any measure of protection. But the
likelihood of such conduct is so extremely remote that the tremendous
price exacted in the attempt not to protect such willful action appears
to be so out of proportion as to be ridiculous. It shows disregard for
the welfare of the carrier to place upon him a burden of expense just
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on the mere and remote chance that some undeserving person might
be protected.
It is either right or it is not right to permit escape from the limita-
tion. I believe it is not right and I know exactly why. I know that it
affects every settlement of a claim that could possibly be optimistically
valued at more than the limit - not the few cases that have been
actually tried. These few cases have cost carrier and passengers a
stupendous fortune, as I have said, and yet all but one in the U. S. have
confined the award to the limit and that one, I believe, was without
merit. This proves that claimants and their lawyers will take a chance
on litigation, regardless of having cases without necessary merit to
prevail, but it does not prove the ultimate cost. The ultimate cost
is not reflected in the verdicts awarded that are over the limitation, but
in the cases settled without actual trial at more than the limit to avoid
the great cost of suit and the always present danger of a "runaway"
verdict.
Without retracting in the least from my sincere advice that both
claimant and air carrier would be benefited by omitting an Escape
Clause entirely from the Convention, I endorse the one recommended
by the Rio Session as perhaps less harmful than many others, since it
at least calls for proof of a definite and definable fact upon which
unlimited liability may be based and does not include an alternative
which leaves the matter to the individual interpretation of the various
courts and juries that would be involved. In other words, if the finder
of fact, whether court or jury, has the latitude of the present Article 25-
"or by such default . . . as, in accordance with the law of the court
to which the case is submitted is considered to be the equivalent to
willful misconduct" or "recklessly not caring whether or not damage
is likely to result" as provided in the Paris draft, all uniformity is
destroyed and each court is left on its own to do what it, rather than
the law, considers proper. To avoid ambiguity, the word "the" should
be inserted between "cause" and "damage."
Applicability to Agents Cleared
The following addition in Article 25 is recommended:
"Article 25A. If under applicable law, a servant or agent of the
carrier is liable for any damage contemplated in the Convention,
he shall be entitled, in an action brought against him before a
court in the territory of a High Contracting Party, to avail himself
of all defences and limits of liability which are available to the
carrier under the provisions of the Convention. The total amount
recoverable from the carrier, his servants and agents together,
shall not exceed the amount which could be recovered from the
carrier under the provisions of the Convention. The provisions of
this Article cannot be invoked by a servant or agent who has acted
with intent to cause damage."
This is another definite improvement of which I strongly approve,
since it clarifies any confusion as to whether the liability of servants
' JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
and agents - which would be imputed to the carrier under U. S. law -
is included in the provisions of the Convention.
Confusion as to Certain Flights
Article 34 which denied Convention application to international
transportation by air performed by way of experimental trial by air
navigation enterprises with a view to the establishment of regular lines
of air navigation or to transportation performed in extraordinary cir-
cumstances outside the normal scope of the air carrier's business is
revised, cutting out the part about experimental flights and retaining
only:
"The Convention does not apply to carriage performed in extra-
ordinary circumstances outside the normal scope of the air carrier'sbusiness."
This whole Article 34 has always been confusing and provocative
of useless litigation. I am glad to see part of it eliminated, but seriously
suggest that the part remaining is still ambiguous and, hence, will
encourage further useless litigation. The whole article should be
omitted.
Ambiguity in Use of "Working Days"
Article 35 provided that "the expression 'days' when used in this
Convention means current days, not working days." The suggestion
now deletes that clear, simple statement by:
"The expression 'days' when used in this Convention means calen-
dar days, not working days, except in Article 26 where, in the case
of damage, the expression shall mean working days."
Article 26 covers the time limit in which persons entitled to the
delivery of baggage or goods have to file their complaint. Since the
whole reason for an international agreement is to gain uniformity and
since "working days" vary greatly in different nations and even in
different localities in the same nation, I believe it most unwise to adopt
"working days" as a basis of time limitation. If the time for complaint
is too short, it should be extended in Article 26 rather than create
ambiguity and misunderstanding. I suggest that Article 35 remain
unchanged.
Conclusion as to the Proposed Revision
It is my conclusion that the revisions sponsored by the Rio Session
of the ICAO Legal Committee are constructive and will result in an
improved treaty, provided the few suggestions based upon my practical
experience in liability matters, and which are principally to avoid
further ambiguity and litigation, are incorporated in the final instru-
ment.
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Right of Action in U. S. Law Needed
I have a further suggestion, of interest only to the U. S. A., but one
that would be of great value to both passengers and carriers in con-
nection with lawsuits brought in the jurisdiction of U. S. A. courts:
A right of action should be created in U.S.A. law for damages in
connection with the death of passengers in accidents occurring in
foreign jurisdictions.
As every lawyer should know, there is no action for wrongful death
provided under the common law. All actions brought in U. S. courts
are based upon the law of the jurisdiction in which the force impinged
that actually causes the injury.'8 Our various jurisdictions, states, ter-
ritories, etc., have passed Death Acts, based generally on the British
Lord Campbell's Act, as have the various British jurisdictions. But
these Death Acts are not extra-territorial. Therefore, even though a
suit for damage is brought in a U. S. court, the right of action must
be based upon the Death Action of the place of accident. When in a
foreign jurisdiction, it is often difficult and expensive to find out what
the law is and, if finally available - in admissible form - it often does
not agree with our American ideas of propriety. As a matter of fact,
there is no action for damages because of wrongful death in some
nations; for instance, India" and Liberia. 8
The U.S. solved this problem in the no-man's land of the high seas
by the Death on the High Seas Act 9 but there is no right of action
created by U.S. law for wrongful death in any foreign jurisdiction.
The British solved this problem by tacking on a Second Schedule 20 to
their Carriage by Air Act, 1932, which enacted the Warsaw Convention
into British law.
I suggest that a Death in Foreign Jurisdictions Act, similar to the
Death on the High Seas Act, be enacted by the Congress. This sub-
stantive right is needed whether or not the Warsaw Convention rules
are applicable. Or, if desirable and procedurally possible, a section
similar to the British Second Schedule might be added to any further
action on the Warsaw Convention, which would help so far as War-
saw cases are concerned.
In necessarily criticizing the conclusions of members of the ACC
staff or of the ICAO Legal Committee - because I honestly disagree
with them - I do so without questioning their undoubted sincerity
or professional integrity. They know much more than I do about
many subjects. I simply have had occasion to have a broader experi-
ence in the practical aspects of liability legislation, and trust that this
experience may be of some value in the difficult task of getting the best
possible revision of an important treaty affecting liability.
161 Avi. 1093; 1943 USAvR 1; 43 NYS (2d) 420; 267 App. Div. 947; 48
NYS (2d) 459; 293 NY 878; 59 NE 2d 785; 324 U.S. 882.
'7 Werkley v. K.L.M. 111 F. Supp. 299; 1953 US&CAvR 194. Previous pro-
ceedinirs. 1952 US&CAvR 1.
Is Old Blue Book, Page 23, Sec. 7 and 9.
19 46 USC 4761.
20 1933 USAvR 317.
